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RECENT DECISIONS
of possible change and the Commission is bound by the original re-
quirements it has promulgated.
The Abranon decision. 38 has not, however, been clarified by
Hymes and remains inconsistent with the decision in that case.
Although the Appellate Division cited Abramson as its authority in
upholding the act of the Commission,3 9 the Court of Appeals in re-
versing the Appellate Division failed even to mention the case. In
light of the Hymes decision the Abramson case might well be re-
stricted to its facts in the future.
The decision of the Court in the Hymes case does not violate
the accepted rule of administrative law that courts will not generally
review discretionary acts of the agency. The reasoning of the Court
of Appeals indicates, and rightly so, that this is not a case of dis-
cretion but rather of agency noncompliance with one of its own
rules. While much can be said for the refusal of the judiciary to
question the wisdom of discretionary acts of the agency, courts should
not be reluctant to review those decisions where what is involved is
not an exercise of discretion but rather the application of its own
rules and regulations. Judicial review is imperative in such cases to
guarantee the continuance of individual rights.
M
ARBITRATION - EQUITY - BOAm'S ORDER OF EMPLOYEE'S
REINSTATEMENT AGAINsT EmPLOYER'S WISHES HELD VALIm.-
Appellant, a foreign corporation, entered into an eleven-year contract
employing respondent in a highly responsible position. The contract
provided that if respondent should be permanently disabled, he would
receive reduced compensation for three years. It was further pro-
vided that any controversy arising out of the contract should be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the American Arbitration
Association Rules, which authorize specific performance of a contract.
The board of directors determined that respondent was permanently
disabled and that his services should be terminated. He disputed
this finding and the controversy was submitted for arbitration. The
Court of Appeals held that the arbitrators' award ordering petitioner's
reinstatement was final and would be confirmed. Matter of Staklinski
(Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1959).
"Arbitration is intended to effect a summary and extrajudicial
38 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
39 See Hymes v. Schechter, 7 App. Div.2d 294, 296, 182 N.Y.S2d 726, 728,(1st Dep't 1959).
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settlement of controversies between parties."' It is deemed a special
proceeding, the jurisdiction of which is in the court specified in the
contract or the submission, and in the absence of any specification,
in the supreme court of the county in which one of the parties resides
or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held.2  Any party
may apply to that court within one year for an order confirming the
award, which must be granted unless the award is vacated, modified
or corrected for one of the reasons prescribed in sections 1458, 1462
or 1462-a of the Civil Practice Act.3
Under these statutes it has been held that an injunction will be
confirmed even though there is a statute forbidding courts from issu-
ing a similar injunction.4  However, one of the grounds provided to
vacate an award is that "the arbitrators, or other persons making the
award exceeded their powers .... ". 5 Courts have from time to time
refused to uphold awards which were illegal 6 or violative of a well
defined public policy.7 In the present case the Court found "no con-
trolling public policy which voids an arbitration agreement like this
one. ... " 8
Whether or not there is such a public policy consideration, either
in the nature of equity jurisprudence or in the law of corporations, is
the basic question raised in this case. If such a consideration exists,
there is authority for the vacating or the modification of the arbi-
trator's award.
1 PRASHKER, NEWV YORK PRACTICE 959 (4th ed. 1959).
2 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1459.
3 Matter of Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902) ; Matter of Weiner
Co. (Freund Co.), 2 App. Div.2d 341, 155 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1956),
aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 806, 144 N.E.2d 647, 166 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1957).
4 Matter of Ruppert (Egelhofer), 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129,
170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
5 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1462(4).
6 Matter of Western Union Tel. Co. (Am. Communications Ass'n, CIO),
299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949), where the court refused to affirm an
award ordering reinstatement of telegraph employees who were refusing to
handle "hot" or "struck" messages. The grounds of decision were: first, that
the collective bargaining agreement was unambiguous in forbidding work
stoppages and in denying to the arbitrator the power to change any of its
terms, hence in finding that the contract had to be read in the light of trade
practices the arbitrators exceeded their powers; second, the action of the
employees was illegal; and third, that the company was under a legal duty to
handle all messages, which duty it could not be expected to perform if it
was required to retain in its service employees who refused to handle certain
messages.
7 Matter of Publishers' Ass'n (Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union),
280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952), in which the court
refused to enforce an arbitrator's award of punitive damages for breach of
contract. The opinion of the present case in the Supreme Court makes the
point that the Publishers' Ass'n case was decided before Matter of Ruppert,
supra note 4, and may be doubtful authority by virtue of that case. See Matter
of Hill. 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
s Matter of Staklinski (Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 N.Y.2d 159, 164, 160 N.E.2d
78, 80, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (1959).
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"The motion to confirm is equivalent to a suit in equity to carry
into effect the terms of the agreement and the arbitration had there-
under." 9 The general rule is that personal service contracts will
not be affirmatively enforced in equity.10 In the law of agency the
distinction is made between the right to revoke an agency, which
does not exist when there is a contract which would thereby be vio-
lated, and the power to revoke which always exists 11 unless some
interest, other than the interest in the compensation for the services,
is involved.1
2
The opinion of the Appellate Division in the present case sug-
gested that the historic attitude of equity toward contracts of personal
service was primarily based on the doctrine of adequacy of remedy
at law, and it was cogently argued that this limitation was essentially
the result of the history of equity, and not applicable to arbitration
proceedings.' 3 The same court considered the question of impos-
sibility of enforcement and answered that this question had been met
before, and that the only distinctive factors in this case were the
greater responsibilities and importance of the plaintiff which did not
provide a "sufficiently permissive basis for distinction." 14 However,
the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division points out that with
one possible exception, a judgment on the pleadings, the cases relied
on by the majority were collective bargaining agreements which are
enforceable in courts of equity.', They are distinguishable from
contracts of personal service, being contracts between groups.
There are reasons which go more to substance than to procedure
or expediency which have restrained courts in this area. Many cases
have said that to enforce contracts strictly personal in their nature
would be intolerable.' 6 "If the relation of employer and employ6 is
1 Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 392,
171 N.E. 579, 582 (1930).
10 Seiler v. Fairex, 23 La. Ann. 397 (1871); Stocker v. Brockelbank,
3 Mac. & G. 250, 42 Eng. Rep. 257 (Ch. 1851); but see Lumley v. Wagner,
1 DeG.M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
11 1 MEcHEm, AGENCY § 563 (2d ed. 1914).
22 See id. at §§ 569-70.
13 Matter of Staklinski (Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 App. Div.2d 565, 569-70,
180 N.Y.S.2d 20, 26-27 (1st Dep't 1958).
14 Id. at 570-71, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
'15 Matter of Staklinski (Pyramid Elec. Co.), supra note 13, at 574, 180
N.Y.S.2d at 30-31. See Matter of United Culinary Bar and Grill Employees,
Local 923, CIO (Schiffman), 272 App. Div. 491, 71 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't
1947), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 577, 86 N.E.2d 104 (1949); Matter of Devery (Daniels
& Kennedy, Inc.), 266 App. Div. 213, 41 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1st Dep't 1943),
aff'd, 292 N.Y. 596, 55 N.E.2d 370 (1944) ; Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div.
631, 227 N.Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1928); Freydberg Bros., Inc. v. Corey,
177 Misc. 560, 31 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 805,
32 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't 1941).
Is See, e.g., Gossard v. Crosby, 132 Iowa 155, 109 N.W. 483 (1906) ; Rigby
v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880); Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham
Ry., 3 DeG.M. & G. 914, 43 Eng. Rep. 358 (Ch. 1853) (dictum); Pickering
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to be of value or profit to either it must be marked by some degree
of mutual confidence and satisfaction, and when these are gone and
their places usurped by dislike and distrust, it is to the advantage
of all concerned that their relation be severed." 17
A further element which must be considered when a contract
of personal service is brought to equity is the issue of involuntary
servitude.' 8 It is extremely doubtful, under the thirteenth amend-
ment and federal legislation concerning it, that any court has the
power to compel specific performance of an employment contract by
an employee. 19 It seems, however, that to compel one man to em-
ploy another, the court must at the same time reasonably insure that
the services will be performed.2 0  Discussing the question of peonage,
a federal court has said that "the rule ... is without exception that
equity will not compel the actual, affirmative performance by an
employ6 of merely personal services, any more than it will compel
an employer to retain in his personal service one who, no matter
for what cause, is not acceptable to him for service of that
character." 21
The corporation involved in the present case was formed under
the laws of New Jersey.22 The statute of New Jersey concerning
the management and control of a corporation is similar to that of
New York. Section 14:7-1 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes
provides: "The business of every corporation shall be managed by
its board of directors .. ,, 23
New York's Stock Corporation Law provides that the directors
of a corporation can remove an employee, agent or officer at their
pleasure.2 4 It has been held that this section gives the corporation
through its directors the same power to revoke an agency that an
v. The Bishop of Ely, 2 Younge & Coll. Ch. 249, 63 Eng. Rep. 109 (Ch. 1843).
See also Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction, 6 CoRi~m= L.Q. 235
(1921).
17 Gossard v. Crosby, supra note 16, at -, 109 N.W. at 486.
18 See Stevens, supra note 16.
19 See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) ; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed.
310 (7th Cir. 1894); Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry.,
271 Fed. 743 (N.D. Ga. 1921); Shaw v. Fisher, 113 S.C. 287, 102 S.E. 325(1920). For a discussion of the question prior to the thirteenth amendment
see The Case of Mary Clark, a Woman of Color, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821).
20 See Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N.Y. 294, 183 N.E. 429 (1932);
Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance, 3 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1903).
But cf. Cook, The Present Status of the "Lack of Mutuality" Rule, 35 YALE
L.J. 897 (1927).21 Arthur v. Oakes, supra note 19, at 318.
22 Matter of Staklinski (Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 App. Div.2d 565, 571,
180 N.Y.S.2d 20, 28 (1st Dep't 1958) (dissenting opinion).
23 N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 14:7-1 (1939). Compare N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 27.24 N.Y. STocK CoRp. LAW § 60. Compare New Jersey's statute, N.J. REV.
STAT. § 14:7-6 (1939), which seems to have received a construction similar
to that given to the New York statute in In re A. A. Grit'ing Iron Co., 63
N.J.L. 168, -, 41 At. 931, 934 (1898).
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individual principal has, although the corporation's liability for breach
of contract endures.25 It is noteworthy that similar words in the
National Banking Act have been construed by the Appellate Division
to permit removal of bank officers without subjecting the bank to
liability even for damages for breach of contract.2
6
It is well settled that courts of equity will not ordinarily enforce
contracts of personal service. This doctrine is based on sound prin-
ciples, substantive as well as procedural. Further, the public policy
of both New York and New Jersey is clear that corporations, par-
ticularly when publicly held, be managed by their boards of directors.
The intentions of the parties to a contract in this area should be
irrelevant in the face of what seems to be a strong public policy. It
can be doubted that the arbitration laws were intended to allow cir-
cumvention of this public policy by provision of an arbitration clause
in a contract of employment. A better solution might have been to
send the parties back to arbitration in order to assess damages.27
)X
BILLS AND NOTES - MUTUAL RESCISSION OF BANK DRAFT
AFTER PAYEE HAS TITLE HELD INVALID.-The purchaser of a bank
draft from defendant bank remitted it to his escrow agent with the
restrictive condition that it should be held until the merchandise,
which he had contracted to buy from the payee, had cleared the
United States Customs.' In the meanwhile, the payee transferred
his interest to the present plaintiff. After a futile request for the
draft was made to the escrowee, the plaintiff obtained a Canadian
judgment in rem for breach of contract, in pursuance of which the
court awarded him the draft. The Court of Appeals held that the
defendant drawer bank was liable to payee's successor on the draft
even though the payment had been countermanded by a subsequent
agreement between the defendant and the remitter. International
Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 160 N.E.2d 656,
189 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959).
A convenient method of transacting a commercial credit venture
in which the creditor will be readily satisfied is through the purchase
25 In re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937).
26 Copeland v. Melrose National Bank, 229 App. Div. 311, 241 N.Y. Supp.
429 (1st Dep't), affd mern., 254 N.Y. 632, 173 N.E. 893 (1930).
27 See Matter of Staklinski (Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 N.Y.2d 159, 164,
160 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1959) (concurring opinion).
The remitter of the bank draft refused to complete the necessary forms
to allow the merchandise to clear through the customs, thereby making it
impossible for the payee to deliver the goods.
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